物联网细分行业_2020年全国互联网细分市场可靠性研究

物联网细分行业

The National Internet Segment Reliability Research explains how the outage of a single Autonomous System might affect the connectivity of the impacted region with the rest of the world. Most of the time, the most critical AS in the region is the dominant ISP on the market, but not always.

全国互联网网段可靠性研究解释了单个自治系统的中断将如何影响受影响地区与世界其他地区的连通性。 大多数时候，该地区最关键的AS是市场上占主导地位的ISP，但并非总是如此。

As the number of alternate routes between AS’s increases (and do not forget that the Internet stands for “interconnected network” — and each network is an AS), so does the fault-tolerance and stability of the Internet across the globe. Although some paths are from the beginning more important than others, establishing as many alternate routes as possible is the only viable way to ensure an adequately robust network.

随着AS之间的备用路由数量增加(并且请不要忘记Internet代表“互连网络”-每个网络都是一个AS)，全球Internet的容错性和稳定性也随之增加。 尽管某些路径从一开始就比其他路径更重要，但建立尽可能多的备用路径是确保足够健壮的网络的唯一可行方法。

The global connectivity of any given AS, regardless of whether it is an international giant or regional player, depends on the quantity and quality of its path to Tier-1 ISPs.

任何给定的AS的全球连通性，无论是国际巨头还是区域性参与者，都取决于其通往1级ISP的路径的数量和质量。

Usually, Tier-1 implies an international company offering global IP transit service over connections with other Tier-1 providers. Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that such connectivity will be maintained all the time. For many ISPs at all “tiers”, losing connection to just one Tier-1 peer would likely render them unreachable from some parts of the world.

通常，Tier-1意味着一家国际公司通过与其他Tier-1提供商的连接提供全球IP传输服务。 但是，不能保证始终保持这种连接。 对于所有“层”上的许多ISP而言，失去与一个Tier-1对等方的连接都可能使它们无法从世界某些地方到达。

互联网可靠性衡量的方法论 (The Methodology of Internet Reliability Measurement)

Examining a case when an AS experiences network degradation, we want to answer the following question: “How many AS’s in the same region would lose connectivity with Tier-1 operators and their global availability along with it?”

检查一个AS遇到网络性能下降的情况，我们要回答以下问题：“同一地区有多少个AS会失去与Tier-1运营商的连接以及它们的全球可用性？”

Throughout the years we model such a situation because at the dawn of BGP and interdomain routing design its creators assumed that every non-transit AS would have at least two upstream providers to guarantee fault tolerance in case one of them goes down.

多年来，我们对这种情况进行了建模，因为在BGP和域间路由设计出现之初，其创建者就假定每个非传输AS都将至少具有两个上游提供程序，以保证其中一个发生故障时的容错能力。

However, the current reality is different; with less than half of all ISPs in the world having only one connection to an upstream transit provider. A range of unconventional relationships among transit ISPs further reduces availability.

但是，当前的现实是不同的。 全球只有不到一半的ISP与上游运输提供商建立一个连接。 传输ISP之间的一系列非常规关系进一步降低了可用性。

Have transit ISPs ever failed? The answer is yes, and it happens with increasing frequency. The more appropriate question is — under what conditions would a particular ISP experience service degradation so severe we would call it an outage? If such problems seem unlikely, it may be worth considering Murphy’s Law: “Anything that can go wrong, will”.

中转ISP是否曾经失败过？ 答案是肯定的，并且它的发生频率越来越高。 更为恰当的问题是，特定的ISP在什么情况下会经历服务降级的严重程度，我们称之为停机？ 如果这些问题似乎不太可能发生，则值得考虑墨菲定律：“任何可能出错的都会，都会”。

To model such a scenario, we have applied the same model for the fourth year in a row. Although again, we did not merely repeat previous calculations — the research is expanding over the years.

为了对这种情况进行建模，我们连续第四年应用了相同的模型。 尽管再次，我们不仅重复了先前的计算-多年来的研究还在不断扩展。

采取以下步骤对AS可靠性进行评分 (The following steps were taken to rate AS reliability)

:

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• For every AS in the world, we examine all alternate paths to Tier-1 operators with the help of an AS relationship model, the core of Qrator.Radar;
  对于世界上的每个AS，我们都将借助Qrator.Radar的AS关系模型来检查通向Tier-1运营商的所有备用路径。
• Using the Maxmind GeoIP database, we matched countries to every IP address of every AS;
  使用Maxmind GeoIP数据库，我们将国家/地区与每个AS的每个IP地址进行了匹配；
• For every AS we calculated the share of its address space that corresponds to the relevant region. ISP’s were filtered out that reside at an Internet Exchange point in a region where they do not have a significant presence. The example we are using here is *, where traffic is exchanged among hundreds of members of HKIX — yet the biggest Asian Internet Exchange, most of which have zero presence in the local internet segment;
  对于每个AS，我们都计算出其地址空间对应于相关区域的份额。 ISP被过滤掉，这些ISP驻留在它们没有大量存在的区域的Internet交换点。 我们在这里使用的示例是香港，香港在HKIX的数百个成员之间进行流量交换，但它是最大的亚洲Internet交换所，其中大多数在本地Internet区段中为零。
• After isolating regional ASs, we analyzed the potential impact of one’s outage on other AS’s as well as their respective countries;
  隔离区域自治系统后，我们分析了中断对其他自治系统及其各自国家的潜在影响；
• In the end, for each country, we identified the AS with the greatest/largest impact on other ASes in their region. Foreign AS’s were not considered.
  最后，我们为每个国家/地区确定了对本地区其他AS影响最大/最大的AS。 未考虑外国AS。
• We took that AS’s impact value as a reliability score for the country. And used that score to rate reliability of countries. The less score­ is — the better reliability is.
  我们将AS的影响值作为该国家的可靠性得分。 并使用该分数来评估国家的可靠性。 分数越少，可靠性越好。

IPv4可靠性 (IPv4 Reliability)

The 2019 column represents the score that an individual country had in the 2019 rating on a certain position.

2019栏代表某个国家在某个职位上的2019评分中的得分。

长话短说 (Long Story Short)

:

：

• The United States regained 10 out of 11 positions they lost in 2019, residing at position 8 in 2020;
  美国在2019年失去的11个职位中重新获得10个，到2020年位于第8位;
• Four new countries entered the Top-20 of reliability rating: Liechtenstein, Japan, Indonesia and Argentina.
  四个新国家进入了可靠性排名的前20名：列支敦士登，日本，印度尼西亚和阿根廷。
• Four countries effectively left the Top-20: Ireland, Bulgaria and Luxembourg and Czech Republic, which is residing at position 21 this year.
  四个国家有效地退出了前20名：爱尔兰，保加利亚，卢森堡和捷克*，它们今年排在第21位。
• * dropped eight positions and closes the Top-20 in 2020;
  香港排名下降了八位，并在2020年排名前20位。
• Singapore lost 11 positions.
  新加坡失去了11个职位。
• A longtime leader of the rating — Germany — gave way to Brazil, the 2020 leader of reliability rating.
  长期的领导者德国–取代了2020年的可靠性领导者巴西。
• Every year exciting movements happen in the reliability rating, often corresponding to what is happening inside the respective regions.
  每年，可靠性等级都会发生激动人心的变化，通常对应于各个区域内部的变化。

First things first — the overall trend in global reliability, counted as an average and medium. This time we are looking at the five years of continuous research:

首先，全球可靠性的总体趋势被视为平均水平。 这次我们正在研究持续研究的五年：

In 2020 the number of countries that successfully improved reliability score to under 10%, indicating high fault tolerance, increased by 5 for the second year in a row, reaching a total of 40.

到2020年，成功将可靠性评分提高到10％以下(表明容错能力强)的国家数量连续第二年增加5个，达到40个。

As you can also see, the average reliability score is improving over time. However, the median stays at comparable levels since 2018 — the lower part of the rating does not improve quickly enough, compared to the upper half.

您还可以看到，平均可靠性得分随着时间的推移而提高。 但是，自2018年以来，中位数一直保持在可比的水平上-与上半部分相比，该下半部分的改善速度不够快。

However, the most significant fact remains — for the period of our research, both IPv4 and IPv6 show significant improvements in reliability. Furthermore, there is an inevitable point in the future, where the IPv6 version of the rating would become the primary one.

但是，最重要的事实仍然存在-在我们的研究期间，IPv4和IPv6均显示出可靠性方面的显着提高。 此外，未来还有不可避免的一点，该等级的IPv6版本将成为主要等级。

IPv6可靠性 (IPv6 Reliability)

In 2020 it seems that something has changed in the perception and adoption of the IPv6 protocol. Google obtains the most appropriate statistics we want to mention.

在2020年，IPv6协议的认知和采用似乎有所变化。 Google获得了我们要提及的最适当的统计信息。

As of September 2020, almost 30% of Google users use the native IPv6 connection, which effectively translates into their ISPs supporting the v6 version of IP protocol.

截至2020年9月，几乎30％的Google用户使用本机IPv6连接，从而有效地转换为支持IP协议v6版本的ISP。

Although the main issue with IPv6 still persists — that is the partial connectivity. Due to peering wars, not universal IPv6 adoption and other issues, the IPv6 still has the problem of limited network visibility. To better understand this, take a look at the IPv6 reliability versus the partial connectivity rate.

尽管IPv6的主要问题仍然存在-那是部分连接。 由于对等战争，而不是普遍采用IPv6和其他问题，IPv6仍然存在网络可见性有限的问题。 为了更好地理解这一点，请看一下IPv6可靠性与部分连接速率之间的关系。

It is evident from this IPv6 Top-20 Reliability to Partial Connectivity Comparison chart that there are several countries where the partial connectivity in IPv6 exceeds 10%: Italy, *, Ireland, Romania.

从此IPv6排名前20位的部分连接可靠性比较表中可以明显看出，有几个国家的IPv6的部分连接率超过10％：意大利，香港，爱尔兰和罗马尼亚。

Looking at the partial connectivity combined with “classic” reliability percentage, showing the share of unavailable in case of an outage resources, we could state that in * alone the IPv6 failure of AS3491 would result in 18% of IPv6-connected resources rendered unavailable. 16% in Ireland; almost the same in Italy and Romania. Those numbers are high even in Great Britain — 7.5%, Germany — 8%, United States — 15%.

结合部分连接性和“经典”可靠性百分比，显示在资源中断的情况下不可用的份额，我们可以说，仅在香港，AS3491的IPv6失败将导致18％的IPv6连接的资源不可用。 爱尔兰为16％； 在意大利和罗马尼亚几乎相同。 即使在英国(7.5％，德国(8％)，美国(15％))，这些数字也很高。

The lowest value among IPv6 Top-20 belongs to Brazil — 4.66%, Netherlands — 4.72% and Japan — 5.24%.

在IPv6前20名中，价值最低的国家是巴西-4.66％，荷兰-4.72％和日本-5.24％。

It seems that in the year 2020 the tides turned and the IPv6 reliability, even considering the partial connectivity, looks better than that of IPv4. Average IPv4 reliability score in 2020 is 36.22%, and for IPv6 the same metrics is as high as 28.71% — and as we measure the outage impact, the lower the metric is — the better. However, it is necessary to mention that the country adoption for IPv6 is twice as low, as in the IPv4 case — the newer version of the protocol still has to go a long way to the total adoption.

看来在2020年，潮流将逆转，即使考虑到部分连接性，IPv6的可靠性也要比IPv4更好。 2020年，IPv4的平均可靠性得分为36.22％，而对于IPv6，相同的指标则高达28.71％，而当我们测量中断影响时，指标越低越好。 但是，有必要提及的是，IPv6的国家采用率是IPv4情况的两倍，这是该协议的较新版本在总体采用率上仍需走很长一段路。

宽带互联网和PTR记录 (Broadband Internet and PTR records)

“Does a country’s leading ISP always influence regional reliability more than everyone else?” — this is the question we are trying to answer with the help of additional information and investigation. We suggest that the most significant (by user base or customer base) ISP in a region is not necessarily the most critical for the region’s network connectivity.

“一个国家领先的ISP是否总是比其他所有人对地区可靠性的影响更大？” -这是我们在其他信息和调查的帮助下试图解决的问题。 我们建议区域中最重要的(按用户群或客户群)ISP对于区域的网络连接不一定是最关键的。

Two years ago, we started to analyze the PTR records. Generally, PTR records are used for Reverse DNS lookup: using the IP-address to identify the associated hostname or domain name.

两年前，我们开始分析PTR记录。 通常，PTR记录用于反向DNS查找：使用IP地址标识关联的主机名或域名。

Since we already know the largest AS’s for every country in the world, we could count the PTR records within their network and determine their share of overall PTR records for the corresponding region. We counted only PTR records and did not calculate the ratio of IP-addresses without PTR records to IP-address with them.

由于我们已经知道世界上每个国家/地区最大的AS，因此我们可以计算其网络中的PTR记录，并确定它们在相应地区的总体PTR记录中所占的份额。 我们仅计算了PTR记录，没有计算没有PTR记录的IP地址与具有它们的IP地址的比率。

So, we are speaking strictly of IP-addresses with PTR records present. The practice of adding those is not universal; some providers do this and others do not.

因此，我们严格来讲是存在PTR记录的IP地址。 加上这些的做法并不普遍。 有些提供程序会这样做，而另一些则不会。

In the PTR-based rating, we are looking at what part of PTR-enabled IP-addresses would go offline with an outage of each country’s AS and the percentage that represents the relevant region.

在基于PTR的评级中，我们正在研究启用PTR的IP地址的哪些部分将因每个国家的AS中断以及代表相关地区的百分比而离线。

Such an approach that considers PTR-records yields very different results. In most cases, not only does the primary regional AS change, but the percentage is entirely different. In all of the generally reliable (from the global availability point of view) regions, the number of PTR-enabled IP-addresses that shut down following an outage of one autonomous system is dozens of times higher. That could mean that the leading national ISP always handles end-users at one point or another.

这种考虑PTR记录的方法会产生非常不同的结果。 在大多数情况下，不仅主要区域AS发生变化，而且百分比完全不同。 从全球可用性的角度来看，在所有通常可靠的区域中，由于一个自治系统中断而关闭的启用PTR的IP地址的数量要增加数十倍。 这可能意味着领先的国家ISP总是在某一点或另一点处理最终用户。

Thus, we should assume that this percentage represents the part of the ISP’s user base and customer base that would go offline (if switching to a second internet service provider were not possible) in the event of an outage. From this perspective, countries appear to be less reliable than they look from the transit point of view. We leave possible conclusions from this PTR-enabled rating to the reader.

因此，我们应该假设该百分比代表了发生故障时ISP的用户群和客户群将脱机的部分(如果无法切换到第二个Internet服务提供商)。 从这个角度看，各国似乎比从过境的角度看更不可靠。 我们会从此启用PTR的评级中给读者一些可能的结论。

仅有一个上行流(存根网络)的ISP及其可靠性 (ISPs With Only One Upstream (Stub networks) and Their Reliability)

In seven out of the top twenty IPv4 Reliability Rating countries, we found a peculiar detail. Suppose we look for the largest provider for “stub networks”, which are essentially networks with only one upstream provider — in some national segments. In that case, we will find another AS and ISP, different from the one responsible for the current classical reliability metric for each national segment.

在排名前20位的IPv4可靠性评级国家中的七个国家中，我们发现了一个奇特的细节。 假设我们正在寻找“存根网络”的最大提供商， “存根网络”实际上是在某些国家/地区细分市场中只有一个上游提供商的网络。 在这种情况下，我们将找到另一个AS和ISP，这与负责每个国家细分市场的当前经典可靠性指标不同。

Here we highlighted the countries from both the top of IPv4 Reliability Rating and IPv6 Reliability Rating for 2020.

在这里，我们从2020年IPv4可靠性等级和IPv6可靠性等级的顶部突出了这些国家。

Let’s talk about the most visible differences between the critical AS in terms of global transit versus the primary upstream choice in a specific region. It is interesting to notice that rarely a critical AS for stub networks would not be the classical global critical AS simultaneously.

让我们来谈一谈关键AS在全球运输与特定地区的主要上游选择之间最明显的区别。 有趣的是，对于存根网络而言，很少有关键AS不会同时成为经典的全局关键AS。

AS174 — Cogent — is special in IPv4. Cogent’s changes are always interesting to investigate — as a Tier-1 with a strong presence in Europe it has a tremendous responsibility, as it is also a critical AS for stub networks, as well as the global transit. In 2020 it is critical AS for IPv6 stub networks in France and Belgium, and in IPv4 Cogent is responsible for all the reliability metrics in Great Britain, France, Belgium (from the IPv4 top 20), but also Ireland’s and Vatican’s global reliability metrics. AS174 — Cogent —在IPv4中是特殊的。 研究Cogent的变化总是很有趣-作为在欧洲拥有很强实力的Tier-1，它承担着巨大的责任，因为它也是存根网络以及全球传输的关键AS。 在2020年，对于在法国和比利时的IPv6存根网络来说，这是至关重要的AS，在IPv4中，Cogent负责英国，法国，比利时(从IPv4前20名起)的所有可靠性指标，还负责爱尔兰和梵蒂冈的全球可靠性指标。

However, the * example is somewhat outstanding. The classical critical AS for the region’s IPv4 connectivity is AS3491 — PCCW Global, a Tier-1 ISP. However, the stub networks’ critical AS is an AS4515 — ERX-STAR — connected to both PCCW Global and * IX. So for ERX-STAR, the situation is the following — if AS3491 somehow fails — it would still retain the regional connectivity through the IX, if, on the other hand, IX fails — the data would be still globally available through the Tier-1 network.

但是，香港的例子有些突出。 用于该地区IPv4连接的经典关键AS是AS3491 — PCCW Global，一级ISP。 但是，存根网络的关键AS是连接到PCCW Global和* IX的AS4515 (ERX-STAR)。 因此，对于ERX-STAR，情况如下-如果AS3491某种程度上失败了-它仍将保留通过IX的区域连通性，另一方面，如果IX失败-数据仍可通过Tier-1在全球范围内使用网络。

That is a particular example of how a significant and profound Internet Exchange in one region could be a substitute for the second strong upstream provider. If there is a big IX nearby, by connecting to it and to only one classical transit ISP you could get almost the same regional reliability as by connecting to the two transit upstreams. Although, once again, IX is not able to fully replace the Tier-1 connection in the global sense — It’s an excellent example of regional versus global connectivity.

这是一个特定示例，说明一个地区中重要而深刻的Internet交换如何替代第二强大的上游提供商。 如果附近有一个较大的IX，则通过连接到它并仅连接到一个经典的传输ISP，您可以获得与连接到两个传输上游的几乎相同的区域可靠性。 尽管IX不能再次在全球范围内完全替代Tier-1连接-这是区域与全球连接的一个很好的例子。

AS6939 — Hurricane Electric — is the stub networks’ critical autonomous systems in both * and the U.S.A. for IPv6. AS6939 (飓风电气)是香港和美国的存根网络的关键自治系统，用于IPv6。

In the IPv4 it also changes — in the U.S.A. the classical reliability arises from the position of AS3356, belonging to the CenturyLink ISP — but the critical AS for stub networks in v4 is AT&T’s AS7018 — another Tier-1 in the national segment of United States.

在IPv4中，它也发生了变化-在美国，经典的可靠性来自AS3356的位置，该位置属于CenturyLink ISP-但是v4中存根网络的关键AS是AT＆T的AS7018-美国*中的另一个Tier-1 。

各地区的详细信息 (Details by Regions)

One of the most important questions to ask ourselves while conducting the 2020 research was: “How was it possible for the U.S. segment to regain some reliability after the dramatical 11 positions drop last year and improve the fault tolerance of the national segment’s Internet, without swapping the ISP in question — CenturyLink?”

在进行2020年研究时，问自己一个最重要的问题是：“在去年急剧下降11个职位并提高了全国网段的互联网容错能力之后，美国网段如何能够重新获得一定的可靠性？有问题的ISP – CenturyLink？”

Well, the first thing is that CenturyLink could have lost some of its market value, and this is probably the main reason why the numbers improved. Although it is hard to say for sure, we tend to think that CenturyLink’s outages in the previous years, and the most recent one, probably motivated their customers to at least try to find some additional transit capabilities, if not refusing the further CenturyLink service at all.

好吧，第一件事是CenturyLink可能失去了部分市场价值，这可能是数字增长的主要原因。 尽管很难肯定地说，但我们倾向于认为CenturyLink在前几年以及最近的一次中断中可能会促使其客户至少尝试寻找一些其他的传输功能，即使不拒绝进一步的CenturyLink服务。所有。

*’s position drop from 2019 to 2020 transition could be connected to the changing situation within the region, although PCCW’s market share almost evidently fluctuated during this year.

尽管电讯盈科的市场份额在今年明显波动，但香港从2019年到2020年过渡期的职位下降可能与该地区的形势变化有关。

We outlined the Singaporean change in critical AS for the region in the last year’s research and, looking at the current change; we could state that AS4657 could be conquering the market further, consolidating as the primary ISP of the country — this would inevitably lead to the drop of the reliability score.

在去年的研究中，我们概述了新加坡在该地区的关键AS方面的变化，并着眼于当前的变化。 我们可以说AS4657可能会进一步征服市场，并巩固其作为该国的主要ISP的地位-这不可避免地导致可靠性得分下降。

As we write this research from the Czech Republic, we feel ourselves obligated to highlight the crucial detail about CZ’s Internet segment. It is probably the only region we know for sure that does not have a single ISP business behind the critical autonomous system for the country. Instead, AS47232 — ISPAlliance — which is critical all around the metrics (classical global transit and stub networks), is a free and voluntary union of smaller ISPs within the Czech Republic. As the company writes on its “Aims and vision” page:

当我们撰写来自捷克*的研究报告时，我们感到自己有义务强调有关CZ互联网细分市场的关键细节。 我们可能唯一确定的地区可能是该国家的关键自治系统背后没有ISP业务。 相反， AS47232 (ISP联盟)对所有指标(经典的全球运输和存根网络)都至关重要，它是捷克*内较小的ISP的免费自愿联盟。 正如公司在“目标和愿景”页面上写道：

“Local telecommunications operators face many difficulties on the market, which put them at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the “big brands” of multinational competition and those who do not play fair. ISP Alliance a.s. we set it up to overcome these difficulties.”

“本地电信运营商在市场上面临许多困难，相对于跨国竞争和不公平竞争的“大品牌”而言，这使他们处于劣势。 我们建立ISP联盟就是为了克服这些困难。”

It does help to overcome the presence of much more significant players in the national segment! That is a good example of a group unification over a reasonable common goal, resulting in a good reliability score, as even with the entering of the Top 20 by four new countries in 2020, Czech Republic is at the position 21 with the reliability score of 6.5%. Moreover, such a small (compared to the other leaders’ size) national segment taking eight place in the quantity of IPv6 enabled ASes is simply a thing that should be thanked for to everyone involved in building and maintaining computer networks.

它确实有助于克服全国细分市场中更重要的参与者的存在！ 这是一个团体在一个合理的共同目标上统一的一个很好的例子，从而获得了很高的可靠性得分，因为即使四个新国家在2020年进入前20名，捷克*的可靠性得分也排在第21位。 6.5％。 此外，在支持IPv6的AS数量中仅占八分之小(与其他*的规模相比)的国家部分，对于参与构建和维护计算机网络的每个人来说，都是一件值得感谢的事情。

Thank you for reading the Reliability Research! In case you have any questions, feel free to contact us on [email protected]

感谢您阅读可靠性研究！ 如有任何疑问，请随时通过[email protected]与我们联系。

翻译自: https://habr.com/en/company/qrator/blog/518650/

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